1 Introduction

This website is unique in recognising that debate cannot produce knowledge; that debate-derived policy is thus belief-only; but that ‘knowledge’ has not been definitively differentiated from ‘belief until now.

As a first attempt at this differentiation, we might tentatively consider that disharmony, violence, revolution and war arise when debate-derived belief-only policy fails in the reality which it ignores, while craftsmanship, science and technology are accepted harmoniously without debate by their success in the reality which they incorporate as knowledge; that were the debate-derived belief-only policies which result in the former to be replaced with knowledge as exemplified by the latter, all forms of disharmony might be avoided; and that while voter alienation is likely to grow with accumulation of belief-only policy failures, accumulation of knowledge-only policy successes is likely to create voter enthusiasm for prioritising their implementation.

As to the failure of debate-derived policy, we might recall that Socrates attributed it to the rhetorical tricks of debaters and the gullibility of voters, rather than to the failure of belief-only debate itself, while Plato believed this failure in reality to be eliminated by rational thought applied to an Ideal Beyond rather than from sense-perception of our reality; that Plato thus believed in non-reality; and that while philosophers such as Mill et al believed full adult suffrage to be the guarantor of successful policy, its continuing failure under just such suffrage is now the cause of voter alienation, knowledge-only policy not having been recognised until now as the only guarantor of success in reality.

Having thus identified the absence of knowledge as the source of belief-only debate and related it to the futility of all such debate since time immemorial, subsequent text to this and other sections will amplify this relationship. Meanwhile, to terminate debate-derived belief-only policy, section 2 presents my definitive differentiation of the knowledge/belief dichotomy as the foundation of my Campaign for Knowledge-Only Policy and on this foundation, section 3 invites readers to join this Campaign. However, for those who wish to read more before joining, sections 4 – 26 supply additional text to clarify the scope of this differentiation and the universal benefit of adopting it. Thus, subsequent text for these and additional sections will amplify the need for and benefit of adopting knowledge-only policy in all fields currently lacking it, my intention being to have it adopted universally and globally.

2 Knowledge of Reality

For knowledge-only policy to be possible, knowledge must be definitively differentiated from belief. To this end, I recognise that reality stimulates the human imagination to rational beliefs transformable to positive or negative knowledge by evaluation of their compliance or non-compliance with reality, or to those which can only be accepted, rejected or suspended as beliefs beyond reality-evaluation in practice or in principle, but which cannot be accepted as knowledge.

Thus, this differentiation shows that while beliefs can be reality-validated to positive knowledge or reality-refuted to negative knowledge, debate of opinion/counter-opinion is merely debate of belief/ counter-belief supported by partially-selected facts/counter-facts, neither set of which amounts to debate-terminating knowledge; that debate-derived belief-only policies thus fail in reality by being incompatible with reality; that knowledge-only policy succeeds in reality by being compatible with it; that success is preferable to failure; that knowledge-only policies ought thus to eliminate their belief-only alternatives; and that enthusiastic participation ought thus to eliminate alienation as soon as voters are offered knowledge-only policies to prioritise for implementation within known resource limits.

Thus, subsequent text to this and other sections will show how the presence/absence of my co-defined reality-evaluation definitively differentiates the knowledge/belief dichotomy and with it those of truth/ falsehood, wisdom/folly, right/wrong and good/bad; and how adoption of this means of differentiation ought to ensure knowledge-only policy success rather than belief-only-only policy failure c.f. sections 14 – 18).

3 Invitation to Readers

In light of sections 1 and 2, this section invites readers to tell others of their acceptance of my now definitive differentiation of the knowledge/belief dichotomy in numbers sufficient to make politicians record their acceptance that knowledge rather than belief must now be the preferred source of policy; and that while ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ have thus far been more or less synonymous in all languages, the presence or absence of my now co-defined reality-evaluation not only differentiates the knowledge/belief dichotomy, but also those of truth/falsehood, wisdom/folly, right/ wrong and good/bad with the clarity to ensure that ‘they speak of little else at the Dog and Duck’.

However, given that acceptance of this invitation may need further exposition, my subsequent text to this and other sections will show that knowledge, truth, wisdom, right and good, all work in reality and are thus definitively and objectively different from belief, falsehood, folly, wrong, and bad which do not work in reality; that my newly defined reality-evaluation of beliefs as specific hypotheses, has been the sole source of the knowledge which is our craftsmanship, science and technology, and of the knowledge-content of our traditional behaviour codes to the extent of their having secured our survival since time immemorial by harmonising our innate selfishness with our innate need for hierarchical social cohesion as the group-species we are; and that this harmonisation has never been complete and thus needs all acquirable relevant knowledge rather than more belief/counter-belief.

Again, to reinforce the need for readers to tell others of their acceptance of this invitation, my subsequent text to this and other sections will show that debate of belief/counter-belief produces only a transient belief-consensus; that the failure in reality of such belief-consensus has always resulted in disharmony, violence, revolution or war; and that this will stop only when knowledge replaces belief, reality being the only secure basis for decision-taking (c.f. sections 4, 5, 10, 14 – 18 and 22 – 26 in particular).

4 Mistake Avoidance

This section will emphasise that the campaign for knowledge-only policy is not a campaign for adjustment of belief-consensus by addition of new facts/counter-facts to any debate of opinion/counter-opinion. It is a campaign for universal acceptance of my newly defined reality-evaluation as the sole means of ensuring that knowledge is not mistaken for belief or vice versa; that knowledge is not mistakenly rejected to sustain debate of belief/counter-belief; that debate itself is terminated by reality-evaluation of belief and counter-belief to positive or negative knowledge; and that knowledge-only policy thus created will reverse voter-alienation.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will show where and how conclusive knowledge is ignored and/or deliberately unsought in order to derive party-political or pressure-group advantage from belief-consensus adjustment through continual debate; where and how the main belief/counter-belief debate is suspended in favour of debating derivative beliefs/counter-beliefs more likely to be thus mistakenly advantageous; where and how supposedly supportive facts and counter-facts are merely re-assertions of belief/counter-belief; and where and how belief-consensus is mistakenly claimed to be knowledge (c.f. sections 1 – 3).

5 Inconclusiveness of Debate

This section will show that while debate airs belief/counter-belief with reference to whatever facts/ counter-facts might be available in the absence of conclusive knowledge, any resulting belief-consensus must thus remain inconclusive; that while early philosophers such as Socrates and Plato recognised this inconclusiveness, they were mistaken in seeking conclusiveness through clarification of the meaning and use of words; in relying on rationality alone, in rejecting sense-perceived reality, and in thus failing to differentiate knowledge from belief in any realistic manner; that later philosophers mistakenly believed debate to be sufficient, provided the resulting consensus was open to the widest possible suffrage; but that modernism now denies the possibility of conclusiveness in mistakenly accepting elective relativism of belief/counter-belief as the best we can expect to achieve.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will cite objective knowledge of reality as the terminator of all belief/counter-belief debate and my newly defined reality-evaluation as the means by which metaphysics, epistemology, political philosophy and all non-observational/non-experimental fields can be seen to be mistaken in their reliance on rationality alone (c.f. sections 1- 4).

6 Craftsmanship

In light of section 2, this section will show that the imagination of early man was successively stimulated by reality to believe that some action by him might benefit him, and that by acting on this belief and observing the result he would learn whether or not it was beneficial. Thus, for example, he might have believed that a stake driven into the ground would stand vertically, that he might drive it in with his fist; that by acting thus he was reality-evaluating his belief to knowledge; that subsequently he might have believed that a heavy stone would be better than his fist and so on; and that such early transformations of reality-stimulated beliefs to knowledge were the dawn of the craftsmanship and of the recognition of cause-effect relationships which since time immemorial have made our survival increasingly comfortable.

Thus my subsequent text to this and other sections will exemplify the role of reality-evaluation in the development of craftsmanship from the hunter-gatherer through the agricultural to the urban stages of social development; from the recycling of non-edibles such as bone, skin, fur and feather through the weaving of vegetable fibres and construction in wood and stone to the metals of the bronze age and beyond, none of which would have been achieved other than by the reality-evaluation of initiating belief to knowledge, whatever else might have remained belief in its absence (c.f. sections 1-5).

7 Science

In light of section 2 this section will show that the scientific method, first fully introduced by Galileo, was the method by which hypotheses (beliefs) as to the cause-effect parameters of natural phenomena could be reality-evaluated by experimentation designed to eliminate all but one possible cause of the effect being investigated; that for such as Karl Popper, C. P. Snow and their followers, the scientific method was thus mistakenly believed to be the collection of evidence in support of parameter correlations for which no cause-effect relationships had been established by experimentation; that while this mistake enabled them to claim openness-to-refutation as the defining characteristic of science and thus mistakenly to believe its knowledge valid only until further evidence is collected, they made no reference to the Galilean experimentation which is the defining characteristic of cause-effect science which though expandable by additional knowledge is never thus refutable; that this mistaken belief led in turn to that of conflating/eliding science with relativist philosophy; that while C.P. Snow believed his ‘two cultures’ to be science and art, he failed otherwise to define either and thus failed to recognise both as knowledge, art being craftsmanship; and that he thus joined the neo-Platonists who conflate/elide knowledge with their self-styled rational belief and are thus anti-science and pro-pseudoscience.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will correct this misunderstanding of science and its method of knowledge acquisition, a misunderstanding which was circulated by Galileo’s contemporary, Descartes; by Francis Bacon, a founder of the Royal Society; and by many of its Fellows even today (c.f. sections 1- 6).

8 Pseudoscience

In light of section 2, this section will show that pseudoscience omits experimentation as to whether or not its correlated parameters are cause and effect; that accordingly its correlations are meaningless, however statistically analysed or mathematically modelled; that pseudoscience can be detected wherever debate is employed to generate a belief-consensus; that once thus detected, it is best ignored; but that it nonetheless persists because its proponents focus public attention on the alleged consequences of its conclusions rather than on the manner by which they were reached. Thus, for example, while the Natural Selection of Darwinism lacked experimental justification, it survives as a theory because public attention has been focussed on its mistakenly alleged consequences for religious belief and anti-religious disbelief.

Again, this section will show that belief in ship-source releases being the cause of species-extinction/ ecological-disaster, persists only because its proponents distract public attention from the non-toxicity of the resulting concentrations in seawater; that belief in the alleged consequences of anthropogenic global warming persists only because its proponents distract public attention from the photosynthesis and biodegradation which continuously recycle carbon dioxide through the atmosphere and the entire biomass of land and sea; from the localised oxygen-depletion which interrupts this biodegradation to produce fossil fuels; and from the Urey reaction and its reversal by the volcanism of tectonic plate movement which continuously recycle carbon dioxide through the atmosphere and carbonate rock.

Yet again, this section will show that hypotheses as to species-extinction/ecological-disaster arising from ship-source releases to the marine environment were reality-refuted by experimentation in the 1970s as confirmed by their absence at any actual incident; that hypotheses as to the rates of abstraction and release of carbon dioxide by biological and geological processes separately or interactively have yet to be reality-evaluated; and that consequently the public is misled to expect anthropogenic global warming from combustion of part of a fossilisation but for which all of its carbon dioxide equivalent would already be recycling through atmosphere, biomass and carbonate rock, especially while increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in controlled atmospheres are already known to produce higher crop yields by more photosynthesis from proportionately more carbon dioxide in these atmospheres.

However, my subsequent text to this and other sections will show that belief in species-extinction/ ecological-disaster though reality-refuted, still persists in thwarting the reality-validated knowledge which would otherwise restore the marine environment to its pre-release state more quickly and cost-effectively than belief-only regulation currently permits; that belief in anthropogenic global warming needlessly raises energy costs; that belief in recycling causes costs to exceed the values recovered; and that knowledge-only policy requires science to replace pseudoscience in general (c.f. sections 1 -7).

9 Collusion in Creating and Adjusting Belief-Consensus

This section will show that far from recognising the need for knowledge to replace belief, political parties collude in adjusting belief-consensus through debate to the extent which permits them to take turns in government; that they thus prefer the flexibility of belief to the rigidity of knowledge; but that the reality thus ignored eventually overwhelms such belief-only collusion in yet another outbreak of disharmony, violence, revolution or war in response to the accumulating failures of belief-only policy .

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will show that while voting ought be retained to prioritise knowledge-only policy options for implementation within known resource limits, voting on belief-only policy options ought be conditional on knowledge being recognised as unavailable pro tem; on belief being recognised as very likely to fail in reality; and on democracy itself being recognised as ultimately sustainable only if knowledge-only policy options replace those of belief-only, whenever and wherever possible (c.f. sections 1 – 8).

10 Transience of Belief-Consensus

This section will show that from earliest times self-selected or group-selected leaders have relied on belief-consensus created by the debating and voting of councillors and advisors; that these were initially such as tribal elders; priesthoods, senates, aristocracies etc; that these are now cabinets, back-benchers, pressure-/focus-groups and the individual voters of democracies; but that no belief-consensus can be other than transient in the absence of the conclusive knowledge of reality which would terminate the debate which otherwise transiently adjusts belief-consensus from debate to subsequent debate.

Again, with Socrates having noticed the transience of belief-consensus from one debate to the next; with Plato having attempted to terminate debate by reliance on rationality alone; and with nobody since having differentiated the knowledge/belief and associated dichotomies as I now have, this section will show for the first time that political history is merely a sequence of belief-consensual responses to belief-consensual failures; that the success/failure ratio of such response is much less than the heads/ tails ratio of coin-tossing; that the failure of belief-only policy has not previously been recognised as reality-refutation of its initiating belief; and that such failure will continue until it is recognised as negative knowledge to be replaced with positive knowledge as soon as possible.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will collectively show the need to replace belief with knowledge wherever and whenever possible (c.f. sections 1 – 9).

11 History as Belief-Consensus Failure Uninfluenced by Knowledge-Only Success

Having shown in sections 9 and 10 that human groupings have responded to the challenges of each successive belief-consensus failure with another belief-consensus despite all of them being more or less failures, this section will show that human groupings have nonetheless failed to replace belief-consensus with knowledge of humanity which would have successfully prevented these challenges or would have successfully responded to them; and that human groupings have failed to extend the knowledge-content of their traditional behaviour codes to this end by reality-evaluating hypotheses progressively derived from them, despite contemporaneously extending the knowledge which is craftsmanship, science and technology by reality-evaluating hypotheses progressively derived from them.

Thus, my subsequent text to this section and others will show that the parallel sequences of our belief-only failures and of our knowledge-only successes were independent, the reality-evaluations of the latter being absent from the former, rather than being applied across the full spectrum; but that far from doing so now, we are actively rejecting the knowledge already available from our traditional behaviour codes, craftsmanship, science and technology in our unquestioning acceptance of arbitrary beliefs in equality, freedom and rights as professed by pseudoscience in general and by its economic, environmentalist, educationalist and sociological expressions in particular (c.f. sections 1 – 10).

12 Inadequacy of Belief-Consensus

This section will show that while historians now attribute social progress to successive implementations of non-religious beliefs in equality, freedom and rights, nobody has previously explained why these implementations have not yet eliminated disharmony, violence revolution and war; that while united kingdoms, united republics or indeed attempts at world government through such as the League of Nations and the United Nations are intended to avoid all such disturbance, nobody has previously explained why such ‘unifications’ have not yet succeeded and indeed have always failed; and that while enthusiasts bemoan the existence of Security Council vetoes, nobody has explained how the UN itself could exist without them, given the preference for localised belief-consensus over universal knowledge-application, despite the mayhem associated with reality’s eventual overthrow of belief-consensus, however wide-ranging initially.

Thus, my subsequent text to this section and others will show that belief-only democracy is possible only so long as some sort of belief-consensus can be maintained; that such is more difficult within a collection of states and is yet more difficult across the world as a whole; that with all state policies being belief-only and with any belief-consensus being more acceptable in one state or union than in another or indeed being unacceptable in others, no attempt has previously been made to resolve belief-only conflict by reality-evaluation of belief/counter-belief to positive or negative knowledge; that in the absence of such resolution the only remaining options are vetoed stalemate, tolerance of difference, or conflict; that whatever is believed about social progress and peaceful coexistence, ‘the strong do as they wish and the weak suffer as they must’ as Thucydides stated in reporting the Peloponnesian War (431 – 404 BC); and that my Campaign for Knowledge-Only Policy to prevent or resolve belief-only conflicts is consequently long overdue. (c.f. sections 1-11).

13 Futility of Debating Opinion/Counter-Opinion

This section will show that no democratic commentator on the current ills of the world has previously done other than offer his or her opinions counter to other opinions in the hope of adjusting debate towards one or other belief-consensus or to overthrow one by another through pro tem voting; that such commentators never allude to the absence of conclusive knowledge nor to the need to acquire it; that they are so far from rejecting belief, as to be substituting it for the knowledge-content of traditional behaviour codes and for the knowledge which we already have from science and its associated technology; and that through pseudoscience they have begun mistakenly to conflate/elide beliefs with knowledge while even nominal scientists now concur rather than to call for more knowledge to be acquired as to our self-reality, to our external-reality in general, and to our environment in particular.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will ask whether our future is to be the continuous failure of debate-derived belief-consensus and pseudoscience, or the continuous success of knowledge acquisition by reality-evaluation of beliefs as specific hypotheses (c.f. sections 1 – 12).

14 Knowledge Contrasted with Three Categories of Belief

To dispel the obscurantism which now seeks to conflate/elide belief with knowledge in pseudoscience’s futile attempts to resolve conflicting beliefs (opinions), this section now differentiates knowledge from three categories of belief by noting, with reference to section 2, that Category A belief is transformable to specific hypotheses for reality-validation or reality-refutation to positive or negative knowledge by direct observation or by observing the results of designed experimentation; that Category B beliefs are inaccessible to reality-evaluation in principle or pro tem practice and thus cannot be transformed to knowledge whether positive or negative; that Category C beliefs persist despite having been reality-refuted; and that no belief can thus be in rational conflict with knowledge.

Again, with reference to section 2, this section now defines the Ur-belief in knowledge as our belief in ourselves and external world being knowable and which accordingly gives rise to the hypotheses of Category A while itself remaining suspended in the unlikelihood of our being able to create hypotheses as to the ultimate nature of reality let alone of our being able to build the experimentation equipment needed to reality-evaluate them. Yet again, this section now defines the Ur-belief of religion as our awareness of the ultimately unknowable, the specific derivatives of which can only be accepted, rejected or suspended, or if touching on the reality of human nature, can be submitted to reality-evaluation as hypotheses of Category A or consigned to Category C as already reality-refuted. Furthermore, this section now defines the Ur-belief in rationality as that which must be rejected as mistaken belief in the acquisition of knowledge without reality-evaluation, though its derivatives can be submitted to reality-evaluation as hypotheses of Category A or consigned to Category C as already reality-refuted, while rationality itself develops mathematics and logic from reality-validated axioms or earlier reality-validated knowledge.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will confirm that conflict arises only between belief and counter-belief; and that it never arises between belief and knowledge except in the irrationality of madness (c.f. sections 1 – 13).

15 Knowledge-Content of Traditional Behaviour Codes and of Religion per se

In light of section 2, this section will show that reality-evaluation of beliefs as specific hypotheses not only produced the knowledge which is craftsmanship, science and technology, but also our self-knowledge of human nature which is the knowledge component of traditional behaviour codes; that this self-knowledge, though now widely decried as out-dated religious belief, is reflected in ethics, literature and political philosophy to the extent to which these harmonise our innate selfishness with our survival-dependent need for social cohesion as the group-species we are; but that the as yet undifferentiated belief-contents of these codes continue to cause disruption and violence counter to this survival.

Again, this section will show that while some derivatives of the religious Ur-belief reflect this self-knowledge as reality-validated by their capacity to provide emotional support and to inspire, motivate and encourage survival-supportive behaviour, others are counter to this survival as reality-refuted by their capacity to produce social disharmony, segregation, violence, revolution and war. Yet again, this section will show that acceptance of this self-knowledge as belief by the religious and its rejection as belief by the anti-religious is a mutual rejection of reality; that our concepts of good/bad and of right/wrong, reflect this self-knowledge of what is conducive/non-conducive to our survival; that our conscience and sense of fairness are our innate acceptance of responsibility for this survival; but that our knowledge-based socially cohesive survival nonetheless continues to be threatened by the collusive knowledge-rejecting beliefs of political/religious leaders and their respective supporters.

Accordingly, my subsequent text to this and other sections will show that my definitive differentiation of knowledge/belief and associated dichotomies of truth/falsehood wisdom/folly right/wrong and good/ bad can resolve all conflicts of belief/counter-belief (c.f. sections 1 – 14).

16 Absence of Knowledge in Anti-Religious Belief

In light of sections 2 and 14, this section will show that the anti-religious rely solely on the rational Ur-belief in rejecting the knowledge-content of traditional behaviour codes as religious belief, while replacing it with their own arbitrary beliefs in equality, freedom and rights; that all anti- and non-religious belief per se is thus devoid of the reality-evaluation which produced the previously undifferentiated knowledge-contents of traditional behaviour codes, ethics and political philosophy; that all such religious, anti-religious and non-religious beliefs must now be reality-evaluated in the contexts of their intended fields of implementation as hypotheses of Category A; and that in moulding social policy to beliefs devoid of prior reality-evaluation, the anti- and non-religious show themselves to be anti-knowledge in their retention of beliefs consignable to Category C by their observed failure on implementation in reality.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will show that all derivatives of my defined Ur-belief in rationality, require reality-evaluation prior to implementation; and that my definition of reality-evaluation replaces epistemology, makes metaphysical-knowledge oxymoronic, and reclassifies social, political, economic and many more modernist fields as pseudoscience replaceable with science by submitting their respective beliefs to the reality-evaluation which converts belief to positive or negative knowledge (c.f. sections 1 – 15).

17 Differentiation of Previously Undifferentiated Mixtures of Knowledge and Belief

In light of sections 2 and 14 – 16, this section will show that literary and dramatic works previously analysed for the formerly undefined truth of their content and the formerly undefined artistry of their presentation can now be analysed for their capacity to inspire, motivate and encourage survival-related behaviour by their reflections of my now defined self-knowledge of humanity, and for their capacity to provide emotional satisfaction through the artistry which I now define as craftsmanship; that religious texts and dramatic ceremonials have not previously been analysed in this way; that the belief/counter-belief debate or open conflict among the religious and between them and the anti-religious mistakenly accepts as belief the reality-validated knowledge-content common to all behaviour codes, while failing to reality-refute their belief-contents as being disharmonious and anti-survival, and while refusing to accept, reject or suspend as personal preference, all beliefs beyond reality-evaluation in principle.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will show that religious and non-religious texts have thus far been undifferentiated mixtures of knowledge and belief, no matter how much the contestants deny it; that the knowledge-content can be differentiated from the belief-content of traditional behaviour codes as in the previous paragraph, while the Ur-belief of religion per se is itself a refection of human desire and as such is reality-validated by its relief of loneliness and its support of survival-related social behaviour even when the belief beyond ultimate reality-evaluation is merely suspended; that anti-religious disbelief bereft of this reflected knowledge neither relieves nor supports, even when the disbelief beyond ultimate reality-evaluation is accepted; and that life or death conflicts of belief/ counter-belief beyond reality-evaluation in principle are expressions of irrational madness whether the believer is religious or anti-religious (c.f. sections 1 – 16).

18 Rational Impossibility of Knowledge-Belief Conflict

Having contrasted the knowledge-content of religion per se with the absence of knowledge-content in its disbelief in sections 14-17, this section will show that no rational conflict can arise between knowledge and Category A beliefs (hypotheses) which become positive or negative knowledge by their reality-evaluation. Nor can conflict arise between knowledge and Category C beliefs already reality-refuted. Again, conflict cannot arise between knowledge and the religious Ur-belief of category B because it and its derivatives are beyond reality-validation or reality-refutation in principle, while both religious and non-religious beliefs of Category B which touch on the reality of human behaviour or of our environment in general can be allocated as hypotheses to category A for reality-evaluation of their positive or negative effects on social harmony or environmental welfare in general or to category C as already reality-refuted by their failure on implementation in the reality of either or both.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will show that beliefs have intrinsic value only as hypotheses for reality-evaluation and thus provide no grounds for dispute let alone life-or-death conflict; that believers, whether religious or anti-religious, have thus far avoided this no-contest resolution by knowledge, only because belief and knowledge were undifferentiated until my third book was published in early 2010; that they must now recognise belief/counter-belief whether religious or non-religious to be the only source of conflict; and that the way to avoid or resolve all such conflict is to reality-evaluate belief to positive or negative knowledge wherever the belief pertains to reality, and to accept, reject or suspend peacefully all beliefs beyond reality-evaluation in principle as matters of personal choice (c.f. sections 2 and 14 – 17 in particular).

19 Previously Missed Opportunities for Knowledge/Belief Differentiation

This section will show that the opportunity to differentiate the dichotomies of knowledge/belief, truth/ falsehood, wisdom/folly, right/wrong and good/bad was missed by hunter-gatherers, early craftsmen and law-givers because having no written records of the means (reality-evaluation) by which their culturally transmitted knowledge had been acquired, they simply believed it to have been gifted by the gods of the beyond, together with mathematics and indeed Creation itself; that it was again missed by Renaissance man who simply followed Plato in believing knowledge to be produced by rational interaction with his ideal beyond; that it was yet again missed by Enlightenment man who expanded his belief in rationality alone, despite the then recent development of the scientific method (reality-evaluation) by which hypothetical beliefs were being converted to knowledge of cause-effect and expressed mathematically.

Thus, with those interested in cause-effect science being always vastly outnumbered by those interested in their self-styled rational beliefs, this section will show that nobody differentiated craft-knowledge from the hypothetical beliefs from which it had been derived by the reality-evaluation of direct observation since time immemorial; and that nobody differentiated our self-knowledge from the hypothetical beliefs from which it had been derived by the reality-evaluation of direct observation over the same timescale. However, while it will show that our self-, craft-, scientific-, and technological-knowledge was independent of self-styled rational belief prior to the so-called Enlightenment, it will also show that far from differentiating knowledge from belief, the self-styled enlightened conflated-elided them with their self-styled rationality to the extent of permitting such as Darwin, Huxley and subsequent Darwinists to exclude cause-effect experimentation and to rely on the arbitrary parameter correlations which now typify pseudoscience; that this pseudoscience has since been transmuted to the relativism which now denies the existence of objective knowledge to the detriment of science in general; and that this regression started because earlier opportunities to differentiate the knowledge/ belief dichotomy had been missed, or even ignored for self-serving ends.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will provide more examples and more details of the instances and consequences of this longstanding failure to differentiate knowledge from belief (c.f. sections 1 -18).

20 Erroneous Argumentation against Knowledge/Belief Differentiation

This section will show relativism to have arisen from rationalists erroneously arguing that religious belief was incompatible with science; that Darwin had shown science to be superior to religion; that science and anti-religion were synonymous; that the rationalism common to both was the source of all Enlightenment progress; that religious belief was irrational and consequently the source of all benighted regression; but that while Darwin was the greatest scientist ever, science changed with time as did all products of rationality; that change itself was the only constant; that all rational belief was thus relative; that rational debate was thus the only valid means of creating and changing belief-consensus and of deciding which debated policy-option would be implemented; that elective democracy was thus the pinnacle of human achievement; and that the democratically derived political situation at any time was the only reality requiring further rational consideration.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will show that such argumentation returns us to the debate of belief/counter-belief which has produced the policy failures which currently alienate voters in the continuing absence of the conclusive knowledge which modernists believe to be inaccessible; and that while belief-only democracy fails to avoid disharmony, violence, revolution and war, knowledge-only democracy has never existed. (c.f. sections 1 – 19).

21 Science Contrasted with Pseudoscience

In recalling that the knowledge which is craftsmanship was created by reality-evaluation of hypothetical beliefs by direct observation of cause and effect, this section now notes that in his work the craftsman manipulates his tool as cause and observes its effect on the work piece until his successive causes have had the overall effect of completing the intended artefact for its useful or decorative function; that craft-like direct observation of nature by such as Aristotle produced the beginning of what I define as descriptive science; that nonetheless the cause of the effect which is a natural phenomenon cannot always be known by direct observation; and that something more is needed to investigate cause and effect in general. Thus, this section now notes that while Aristotle believed bodies to fall at speeds dependent on their weights, Galileo treated this belief as a hypothesis for evaluation by designed experimentation; that he was thus the first to know them to fall at speeds independent of weight but with an acceleration, from which knowledge he was able to explain the motion of bodies in general whether they be free-falling objects, projected cannon balls, or swinging pendulums; that from this Newton was later to explain the motion of the moon; that scientific cause-effect knowledge is thus produced only by experimentation designed to permit quantified causes to have observable quantified effects expressible mathematically; that this approach enables quantified effects to be predicted from quantified causes; and that this is the basis of all physicochemical science and of all sciences based upon it.

In contrast, this section now also notes that pseudoscience is belief not yet reality-evaluated by direct observation or by designed cause-effect experimentation; that instead, it selects an effect, attributes a cause and proceeds to correlate variation of the one with variation of the other regardless of the limitless number of others which would also have such numerical correlations with either or both; that nonetheless, statistics are cited in justification of such arbitrarily selected correlations; but that while the statistics per se may be unimpeachable, the correlation is no less arbitrary than the initial selection of cause-effect parameters. Indeed, even supposing these parameters were cause and effect, the statistical analysis per se would not necessarily tell which was which. Again, this section notes that sustaining belief in such correlations often involves rejection of existing knowledge or refusal to reality-evaluate the belief for fear of thus refuting it; and that the resulting belief-based policies are sustained solely by the pseudoscience to which their failures are attributable though never so attributed, as is now possible, by noting the absence of my newly defined reality-evaluation..

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will show that pseudoscience-inspired belief-only policies fail in economics, environmentalism, education, welfare, child protection, criminology, drug use/misuse, medicine, psychology etc; and that all such failure is avoidable by replacing pseudoscience with science; with commonsense as now defined as knowledge traditionally/culturally available to all; or with positive knowledge derived from reality-evaluation of pseudoscience, having rejected its beliefs as thus identified negative knowledge (c.f. sections 1 – 20).

22 Need to Replace Belief with Knowledge

Readers of this website should by now have agreed on the need to implement knowledge-only policy instead of its belief-only alternatives. However, before proceeding to my subsequent texts in support of the above sections, readers might reinforce their agreement by listing for themselves the current policy areas which are other than abject failures, thus revealing by the shortness of the list the extent of the need for our Campaign for Knowledge-Only Policy and of the need to encourage others to support it.

Again, before proceeding to my further supportive texts, readers might reflect on the extent to which belief (as now defined) requires external authority whether it be canonical or secularly legislative; on the ability of knowledge (as now defined) to speak for itself when given the opportunity to do so; on the extent to which belief-only legislation now invades fields previously managed by tradition and commonsense; on the thus achievable nature of our Campaign; and on the effort needed to advance it being little more than to spread its acceptance by directing others to this website.

Meanwhile, my subsequent text to this section and others will reinforce this need, for the further satisfaction of which I will add further sections and supportive text as may be found helpful in further promotion of this Campaign for Knowledge-Only Policy.

23 Means Adequate to Need

This section now shows that the need to change from belief to knowledge in policy formulation will not be satisfied by participating in belief/counter-belief debate; that this need will be satisfied only by terminating all such debate by reference to its futility as reality-validated by the current failure rate of belief-consensus implementations; that knowledge or recognition of the need for its further acquisition are the only means by which debate and its failures can be terminated in practice; that the relevant knowledge can be acquired only by reality-evaluating contending beliefs/counter-beliefs or more likely by reality-evaluating hypotheses derived from existing knowledge to acquire the new knowledge needed to refute the said beliefs; and that while these needs have never been previously satisfied, they will continue to be unsatisfied unless alienated voters and rebelling politicians support this Campaign for Knowledge-Only Policy.

Thus, my subsequent text to this section will show how and where this Campaign has already delivered its intended results and how and where it may next be expected to deliver them most quickly by the means outlined in these and future sections (c .f. sections 3, 22, and 26).

24 Means Obstructive of Need

This section will show that those most adept at the creation and adjustment of belief-consensus are those whose education consisted in learning how to compare, contrast and construe any contention placed before them; that neither they nor their educators ever do other than treat beliefs/counter-beliefs in this way by citing facts/counter-facts without being aware of the need for or the absence of conclusive knowledge; that in doing so they learn to make rhetorical references to rational/irrational, to real/unreal and to the dichotomies of knowledge/belief, truth/falsehood, wisdom/folly, right/wrong and good/bad without ever recognising the need to define any of them, let alone the need for a definition which embraces all of them; that having graduated in the ability to gain and retain facts and in the ability to compare, contrast and construe them, they enter politics to run the country, the civil service to advise politicians how to run it, or the media to comment on how it is being run; and that in doing so, they do no more than they did in writing their school and university essays. Indeed even those who join the political establishment to make a difference through their previous acquisition of relevant professional knowledge, are initially surprised at the ease with which such knowledge is ignored by politicians, administrative civil servants, and media commentators all of whom have a vested interest in the continuous debate of belief/counter-belief to party- or self-advantage.

Thus, my subsequent text to this and other sections will note this adherence to belief/counter-belief and emphasise the pressing need to bypass it to apply existing knowledge or to acquire new knowledge, it being a proud boast of the administrative generalist that he/she can take decisions on any matter without any personal knowledge whatsoever. Again, my subsequent texts will identify commentators who serve our purpose by delineating the failures of the political establishment without ever suggesting how they might be avoided or corrected and who thus self-identify as possible supporters of this Campaign for Knowledge-Only Policy instead of simply remaining supporters of belief-only changes which by being acceptable to one or other set of political-party beliefs might prove acceptable to supporters in sufficient numbers to keep one party in power or to replace it with another, such being the only discernable objective of political comment thus far (c.f. sections 5, 9 – 13, and 19 – 23).

25 Timeliness of Our Campaign for Knowledge-Only Policy

This section will show that while voters are becoming alienated from party-politics, members of parliament are becoming alienated from their own cabinets, shadow cabinets and respective whips; that these alienations are confirmed by decreasing turn-outs at local and general elections and by the non-party voting patterns of individual members of parliament; that some members are beginning to cite this development as confirming a rebirth of democracy freed from party restraint; and that commentators are beginning to foresee this rebirth leading to the election of individuals on the basis of their own manifestos with the house then voting freely on any and every issue as it arises. However, while widening alienation increases the timeliness of our campaign for party manifestos to be based on knowledge-only and for elective voting to prioritise knowledge-only policies for implementation within known resource-limits, this timeliness is further enhanced by any moves to extend democracy beyond the beliefs of individual voters to those of individually voting politicians thus creating even more belief-derived failure-ridden chaos than we already have.

Accordingly, subsequent text to this section will emphasise the need and timeliness for party-specific policies to be knowledge-only and for their prioritisation to be by general suffrage followed by party-voting in parliament, these commentator-discerned developments making knowledge-only policies even more essential than they already are. Thus, subsequent texts to this section will emphasise the need and timeliness of this Campaign (c.f. sections 5, 10, 13 and 22 in particular).

26 Further Inducements to Campaign for Knowledge-Only Policy

While the current failure of belief-only policies within the UK would have been sufficient inducement for this Campaign for Knowledge-Only Policy without the prospect of an increased rate of future failures, this section will recall that these policies have also initiated our involvement in a unification of Europe, and a de-unification of the UK prior to possible re-unification with Europe; that already alienated voters are thus being asked to support belief-inspired failures at ever-increasing scales; that in addition, western belief-only democracies are showing increasing tendency to intervene in the internal affairs of others to export a belief-only democracy from which its own electorates are being increasingly alienated and to which intended recipients have no more than a belief/counter-belief response; and that, accordingly, the inducement to join this Campaign for Knowledge-Only Policy has become universal.

Further to this universal dimension, this section will show that knowledge-only policies will resolve problems which otherwise can only worsen; that knowledge unifies the human family; that belief/ counter-belief divides it; that the knowledge/belief and associated dichotomies are easily differentiated by noting the presence/absence of my newly defined reality-evaluation; that knowledge is thus easily identified for universal and peaceful acceptance; that beliefs are equally easily identified for reality evaluation and that beliefs/counter-beliefs beyond reality-evaluation in principle are easily identified for universal and peaceful acceptance, rejection or suspension according to personal preference within all religious and secular communities.
Thus, subsequent text to this section will show that the knowledge which is craftsmanship, science and technology is universally and peacefully acceptable to all; that all including west and east, democrat and non-democrat, religious and non-religious have yet to differentiate knowledge from belief and science from pseudoscience by the presence or absence of the reality-evaluation defined herein; and that when one country adopts this peaceful knowledge-only approach to policy, it will be emulated as universally as was and is knowledge-only craftsmanship science and technology (c.f. sections 3, 13, 22 and 23).